Message from Jim
Flooding is unfortunately viewed by many people as a low probability event, instead of a high consequence event. Common beliefs include, “it will not happen to me”, “it will only occur once in my life”, or “the maps accurately show flood risk when not placed in a Special Flood Hazard Area”, which allow many to stay conveniently detached from a very dangerous and identifiable risk which continues to grow.
As a land surveyor, my initial interest in the flood program was with Elevation Certificates and Letters of Map Amendment, and then understanding the maps. This followed with a desire to educate others as to the difference between the perceived risk of the maps and actual risk based on a real storm. This process developed a greater interest in mitigation for two main reasons: the quality of the underlying map data may not be as accurate or current as many may believe, and it is impossible to control an actual storm with a line on a map. Continuing on this journey, interest turned to better understanding behaviors in the decision process of living, investing, rebuilding, etc. in and around flood risk areas, and not just in the Special Flood Hazard Area.
In last month’s Association of State Floodplain Manager’s newsletter, Michele Mihalovich mentioned a book titled, The Ostrich Paradox by Wharton professors Robert Meyer and Howard Kunreuther. It introduces six systematic biases we use to instinctively perceive risk:
Myopia – a focus on short time horizons when appraising immediate costs versus the potential benefits of an investment.
Amnesia – a tendency to quickly forget lessons of past disasters.
Optimism – a tendency to underestimate losses from future hazards.
Inertia – a tendency to maintain a status quo.
Simplification – the selection of only a portion of the relevant factors when considering risk.
Herding – a tendency to base choices on observed actions of others.
The book closes with developing a Problem-Solution Matrix for flood risk. In other words, it conveys suggestions to aid in overcoming each of the above biases. For example, looking at optimism bias, it is often fueled by our inability to have a good mental grasp of the meaning of small probabilities. The concept of the 100-year flood being a 1% annual chance event (not a flood that occurs every 100 years), does not gain enough attention to the fact that a flood will eventually arrive. Educating homeowners about the 26% chance that a flooding event will occur during the life of a 30-year loan is much more practical and easier to understand. Though a 1 in 4 chance is very similar to a 26% chance, the optimism bias pulls many to a place of comfort when a ratio is used.
With inertia bias, personal behavior as it pertains to flood is based on comparing short term cost with long term benefits which may not even occur. The probability of flood damage occurring in a specific location, in a given year, and with the extent of damage being highly uncertain, is very ambiguous and makes proper planning very daunting. Inertia bias creates a tendency to avoid mitigation decisions altogether.
Though new maps and data are extremely important for many reasons for the flood program to be more welcomed, understanding behavior and biases of the many involved should also become a large part of any future mitigation strategy.
